

# Forensic Statistics: Ready for consumption?

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# In a nutshell (I)

Everyday statistics: The role of a statistician in research and consultation ... Two way interaction, adapting models to findings, adapting questions to findings. Two popular paradigms: frequentist, Bayesian. Pros and cons; modern pragmatic synthesis (not a dichotomy but a spectrum). Different applications require a different place in the spectrum (or even a move in another dimension).

Statistics in the court room is however not everyday statistics. Present consensus in forensic statistics: the statistician should merely report the likelihood ratio (LR). This because combining information and drawing conclusions is the job of the jury/the judges. The statistician must just report what her expertise tells her about the question put her by the judge (statistics: modelling/interpreting/learning from chance). NB difference between statistics in police criminal investigation and in the court room.

Problems with LR:

- who determines the hypotheses?
- which data?
- must the defense specify/accept a hypothesis?
- importance of how the data was obtained: evidence = message + messenger
- composite hypotheses
- posthoc hypotheses
- interpretation, dangers [ignorance=uniform probability? 3 doors problem. Lucia]

# In a nutshell (II)

## Examples:

- 1.) DNA matching. Database-search controversy
- 2.) Forensic glass; modelling of between and within source variation (Aitken et al.)  
We need to develop (empirically calibrated) likelihood ratio  
(solve curse of dimension: empirical Bayes?, statistical learning? targeted likelihood)
- 3.) Lucia de B. shift-roster data
- 4.) Tamara Wolvers case: combination of various (poor) DNA traces

In each of the examples, even the simplest, I'll show that there are a lot of problems with the LR approach. Big challenges (both from legal and statistical point of view). Two-way interaction is necessary, preferably before we meet in the court-room!

## References:

Robertson and Vignaux: don't teach statistics to lawyers!

Seeking truth with statistics:

<http://plus.maths.org/latestnews/may-aug04/statslaw/index.html>

Meester & Sjerps: Database search controversy and two-stain problem

Sjerps: Statistiek in de rechtszaal. Stator. <http://www.kennislink.nl/web/show?id=111865>

# Everyday statistics

- Intensive two-way interaction between statistician and subject-matter expert (client)

Cyclic process of re-evaluation of data/  
models/questions

or

- Use of standard methodology in standard situation where the user knows what “standard” means ( $2 \times$ )

# Not in the court-room

- Classical (frequentistic) statistics:
  - significance tests
  - confidence intervals
  - p-values ...

are neither appropriate nor understood
- Bayesiaanse (subjective) statistics is too complex, not appropriate (illegal)
- No place for discussion with subject-matter expert

# What are we left with?

- Likelihood ratio (LR): numerical expression of “weight of evidence”
- $$\text{LR} = \frac{\text{Prob}(\text{evidence} \mid \text{prosecution})}{\text{Prob}(\text{evidence} \mid \text{defense})}$$
- Bayes theorem:  
posterior odds  
= prior odds  
× LR

# Bayes, sequential

- posterior odds (given  $A, B, C$ ) =  
prior odds  $\times$  LR for  $A, B, C$
- LR for  $A, B, C$   
= LR for  $A$   
 $\times$  LR for  $B$  given  $A$   
 $\times$  LR for  $C$  given  $A, B$

# Example 1: DNA match

- Chance of profile “A” is 1 in 5,000
- DNA perpetrator (“*crime stain*”) has profile “A”
- DNA suspect has profile “A”
- Prob( match | perpetrator profile, prosecution ) = 1
- Prob( match | perpetrator profile, defence) =  
$$1 / 5,000$$
- LR=  $P(\text{ data } | H_P) / P(\text{ data } | H_D) = 5,000$



# DNA match after “database search”

- Suspect found in data-base of 5,000 people, in which he is the only match
- Prob. of a unique match is approx.  $e^{-1}$ , “weight of evidence” is about 2.7
- LR of 5,000 was for a “post-hoc” hypothesis

# Alternative LR for DNA match

- Compute simultaneous probability of *all* profiles in database *and* “crime-stain” under two hypotheses (perpetrator in / not in database)
- LR = quotient of these two probs  
(in our case: a unique match, profile “A”)

$$\text{LR} =$$

$$1 / \text{size database} \times \text{frequency profile “A”}$$

$$= 1$$

[but if database = whole population?!]

# DNA match:

1 or 2.7 or 5,000 !?

- What is “the evidence” ?
- What are the hypotheses?
- Meester and Sjerps: the “a priori” chance that the suspect is the source of the DNA in the crime-stain is very different when he was found from the database, than when he was already a suspect! It’s not the statistician’s job to specify these prior probabilities!

(posthoc problem)

- The LR for a post-hoc hypothesis is only meaningful in a *total* Bayesian approach  
[cf. lottery winner]
- The “evidence” is not just the *DNA match* but also the reason why the match was found – the message + messenger!            [Indeed: *missing* evidence is also evidence!]
- The LR should be determined on the basis of a priori specified hypotheses and for carefully described “evidence”; only then is it interpretable  
[a LR of 5,000 occurs less than once in 5,000 times, if  $H_D$  is true]

# Example 2:

## Forensic glass

- Database: measurements of elemental composition of glass fragments (% Si, Na, Al, ...)  
*within source* and *between source* variation
- Case: 2 samples: fragment(s) broken window pane at scene of crime, fragment(s) in the suspect's clothing
- Combine *similarity* of the 2 samples with their *rarity* in the light of other samples (cf. database)

cf: LCN and incomplete DNA-profile; signatures and handwriting; fingerprints; texts; ecstasy pills; ...

# Forensic glass

- prosecution: 2 fragments same pane
- defence: 2 fragments different panes
- Aitken et al.: *estimate*  $LR = p(x,y)/p(x)p(y)$   
with advanced applied statistical methodology ...

# Forensic glass

This can be simplified slightly so that the numerator of the LR

$$\frac{1}{m} (2\pi)^{-p} \left| \frac{U}{n_c} + \frac{U}{n_r} \right|^{-1/2} \left| C + \frac{U}{n_c + n_r} \right|^{-1/2} |h^2 C|^{-1/2} \left| \left( C + \frac{U}{n_c + n_r} \right)^{-1} + (h^2 C)^{-1} \right|^{-1/2} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_1 - \bar{\mathbf{y}}_2)^T \left( \frac{U}{n_c} + \frac{U}{n_r} \right)^{-1} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_1 - \bar{\mathbf{y}}_2) \right\} \sum_{i=1}^m \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_{12} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)^T \left[ \left( C + \frac{U}{n_c + n_r} \right) + (h^2 C) \right]^{-1} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_{12} - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i) \right\}$$

The first term in the denominator is

$$\int f(\bar{\mathbf{y}}_1 | \mu) f(\mu) d\mu = \frac{1}{m} (2\pi)^{-p/2} \left| C + \frac{U}{n_c} \right|^{-1/2} |h^2 C|^{-1/2} \left| \left( C + \frac{U}{n_c} \right)^{-1} + (h^2 C)^{-1} \right|^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^m \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_1 - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)^T \left[ \left( C + \frac{U}{n_c} \right) + (h^2 C) \right]^{-1} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_1 - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i) \right\}$$

The second term in the denominator is

$$\int f(\bar{\mathbf{y}}_2 | \mu) f(\mu) d\mu = \frac{1}{m} (2\pi)^{-p/2} \left| C + \frac{U}{n_r} \right|^{-1/2} |h^2 C|^{-1/2} \left| \left( C + \frac{U}{n_r} \right)^{-1} + (h^2 C)^{-1} \right|^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^m \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_2 - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i)^T \left[ \left( C + \frac{U}{n_r} \right) + (h^2 C) \right]^{-1} (\bar{\mathbf{y}}_2 - \bar{\mathbf{x}}_i) \right\}$$

# Forensic glass

- Challenging statistics (high dimensional compositional data, many zero's; parametric? non-parametric?)
- At their best, the models are a rough approx.
- The data-base is not really a random sample...
- In the situation when the evidence counts, we are making a gross extrapolation
- Need: validation, calibration.  
Sufficiency: the likelihood ratio of the likelihood ratio is itself. So the empirical likelihood ratio of the likelihood ratio should be itself!



# Forensic glass

- Sufficiency: the likelihood ratio of the likelihood ratio is itself!
- Proposal: “estimate” the likelihood ratio anyway you like
- It’s a function of the *2 samples* (crime scene, suspect)
- Use the data-base to *sample LR’s* under both hypotheses (prosecution, defense:  $H_P$ ,  $H_D$  )
- Estimate the ratio of the densities of the two sampled LR’s (which should be monotone)
- Test the hypothesis of monotony

# Forensic glass

- Estimation, testing is based on greatest convex minorant of the QQ plot of sample under  $H_P$  against the combined sample  $H_P + H_D$
- Proposal: “estimate” the likelihood ratio anyway you like
- It’s a function of the *2 samples* (crime scene, suspect)
- Use the data-base to *sample LR’s* under both hypotheses
- Estimate the ratio of the densities of the two sampled LR’s (which should be monotone)
- Test the hypothesis of monotony using non-parametric generalised likelihood ratio test

# Example 3: Lucia

## Original data

Shifts	Incident	No inc.	Total
Lucia	9	133	142
No L.	0	887	887
Total	9	1020	1029

- Fisher exact test  
 $p = 15$  per billion
- Binomial test (days w. incident & L.)

$$p = 50 \text{ per million}$$

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## Corrected data

- Fisher exact test

$$p = 0.2 \text{ pro mille}$$

- Binomial test (days w. incident & L.)

$$p = 4 \%$$

Shifts	Incident	No inc.	Total
Lucia	7	135	142
No L.	4	883	887
Total	11	1018	1029

- Heterogeneity model, JKZ+RKZ,  $p = 5\%$

# Lucia: problems

- The data: “selection bias”,  
definition “shift w. incident” – *blinding*?
- [Bayes vs. frequentistic]
- LR: specification hypotheses prosecution,  
defence? Post-hoc!
- The notion of “chance” is not unequivocal;  
“ignorance” does not guarantee “*pure*  
chance”
- Information from other periods in same ward?

# Lucia: epidemiological, causal thinking

- Clusters of incidents between long incident-less periods seems to be the *norm*
- Shifts follow a regular pattern  
so if one incident “hits” your shifts it is likely there’ll be more (In Lucia case,  $7=2+2+3$  incidents belonged to 3 children)
- Serious empirical research into the “normal situation” has *never, ever*, been done!
- World-wide epidemic of *collapsed cases*

# Example 4

- Tamara Wolvers: three separate kinds of DNA evidence
- Three separate forensic reports, in each case “the DNA profile does not *exclude* the suspect”
- Neither prosecution nor judge could combine the three match chances (can it be done?? ...)
- The suspect went free
- No “control” measurements (what is normal?)

# Conclusion

- Statistics in court is *still far from* everyday statistics; it is challenging and important for lawyers and statisticians
- For the time being: use in detection rather than proof?

# Appendix:

*Bayes nets, the solution of everything ?*

- Bulldozer-ram-robbery
- Sweeney case

Bayes net/graphical model: quantitative combination of (sometimes contradictory) evidence of varying character

Compute likelihood ratio for complex composite evidence, taking account of dependence and independences (Taroni, Aitken, Dawid, ...)



# Bulldozer-ram-robbery

The use of Bayesian networks for combining forensic evidence in a Dutch criminal case

Sonja Scheer

January 30, 2006


Hierarchy of propositions:

source (the stain is from the defendant)

activity (contact, transfer)

crime (guilt, innocence)

The forensic statistician restricts herself to source and activity



Conclusion: ... taught us much, but unsatisfactory

# Kevin Sweeney case

**The probability that Kevin Sweeney murdered his wife ...  
is very small indeed**

**Richard Gill, Aart de Vos**

University Leiden, Free University Amsterdam  
Draft discussion paper

March 25, 2008

It was a warm summer night in 1995. Kevin Sweeney left his wife Suzanne Davies at their new home in Steensel (near Eindhoven) at 02:00 a.m. Between 02:47 and 03:00, two policemen and the housekeeper walked all around the house not noticing anything, in response to a burglar alarm at the alarm centre. At about 03:45 a fire was reported – clients still on sitting on the terrace of the café across the road saw flames in the upstairs bedroom window. Firemen arrived at 03:55. Suzanne Davies was pronounced dead at 04:37 by carbon monoxide poisoning. Many facts were unclear, but the main riddle is the time span if Kevin set the fire alight before 2.00. House room fires start rapidly. In 6 attempts by TNO (using petrol and a naked flame) the fire spread within 5 minutes. But also fires started by a discarded cigarette start very rapidly.

T	P(T I)	P(T G)	likelihood ratio P(T G)/ P(T ¬G)	If prior Odds <b>10</b>	Post odds P(G T)	P(G T)× P(T I)
2:00						
2:15	3.0E-09	0.9	5.4	54	0.982	2.9E-09
2:30	5.9E-08	0.09	0.54	5.4	0.844	5.0E-08
2:45	1.2E-05	0.009	0.054	0.54	0.351	4.2E-06
3:00	4.8E-04	0.0009	0.0054	0.054	0.051	2.4E-05
3:15	4.8E-02	0.00009	0.00054	0.0054	0.005	2.6E-04
3:30	9.5E-01	0.000009	0.000054	0.00054	0.001	5.1E-04
P(G I)						<b>0.080%</b>

See also A. Derksen (2008), *Het OM in de Fout*

# Kevin Sweeney case

Het 'vergeten' tijdspad.

*De anatomische ontleding van een bewijscorpus voor moord door brandstichting; met het 'scheermes' van Ockham.*

F.W.J.Vos, 17 mei 2008

Distinguish between definite primary *observation* and secondary *interpretations* thereof; also the observations which *ought to have been there* ... showed that our *Bayes net* was based on completely wrong ideas (forensic fire-expert F. Vos).

F. Vos: all observation compatible with a completely "normal" accident

Needed: *expert* combination of fire-forensic, chemical, pathological, toxicological evidence

Conclusion: ... *if you need statistics...* ?